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r
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
No. 14840

-vsJOHNNIE OWEN WADE,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged in a criminal proceeding by
the State of Utah, with three counts of automobile homicide
in violation of Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-207 (Supp. 1977).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On September 27, 1976, appellant was found guilty of
automobile homicide, as charged in the information, by
Judge Allen B. Sorensen, sitting without a jury, in the Fourth
Judicial District Court, in an for Utah County, State of Utah,
and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0 to 5 years
in the Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
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Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment of

........._ the court b elow.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Late in the evening of May 10, 1976, a pick-up
truck and a small, foreign car crashed head-on along a stre:
of Highway 91, approximately two miles west of Goshen, Utah,
Killed in the crash were Mrs. Thomas (Debra) Cox and her tic
Injured were Thomas Co;

small children, Melinda and Jeremy.

and appellant, who was subsequently charged with automobile
homicide.
At trial, waitress Myrna Butler, an employee of
Walt's Cafe in Santaquin, Utah, testified that she served
three pitchers of beer and no food to two men whom she ident:·'
fied as appellant and his companion, Leo Craig Finster, on
1

I

the night of May 10, 1976.

(T.17)

Appellant arrived at the,

cafe at approximately 7: 30 p.m. and left about 10:30 with
Leo Finster.

(T.18)

I

Ms. Butler testified that as the two I

left, one man commented to the other, "Well, you will havetoi

I
drive."

(T.18)

I
I

Leo Finster testified that he and appellant
talked and drank beer at Walt's Cafe on the evening of

Mayll1

ft Finster
As the two 1e '

I

· d t h at appe 11 ant as k e d h im
· i· f he wanted to drive.
testi· f ie
the hO~e o'
Finster said he did and drove appellant's truck to

!

til nearly eleven o'clock.

(T.23)

t"

appellant's girlfriend. (T.24)
house to the truck,

As appellant returned from '

he told Finster he (the appel 1an

t)

was

.
how to d:Jive.
1:
going
to
drive,
that
would
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With appellant driving, the two men headed west
out of Santaquin on the two-lane State Highway 91.

According to

Finster, they crossed a set of railroad tracks and appellant
t:egan going around a curve when Finster saw a set of headlights
coming toward them which appeared to be crossing into their lane.
Then the two vehicles crashed.

(T. 27 -34)

(T. 27)

Finster

also testified that he told passerby Mike Okelberry that he was
not driving.

(T .13)

Shorty after the accident, Leo Finster

consented to a blood alcohol test, which determined that the
~rcent

of alcohol in his blood was 0.08% (State's Exhibit

#6).

The third state's witness was Thomas Cox, the driver
of the vehicle in which the fatalities occurred.

Mr. Cox

testified that on May 10, 19 76, he had completed his workday
for the Kennecott Copper Corporation at the Burgen Mine at
10:40 p.m., and that his wife had picked him up.

(T.35-36)

At approximately 11:00 o'clock he, his wife, and their two young
children were travelling east on State Highway 91 toward their
home in Payson, Utah.

(T.37)

Honda at approximately 55 mph.

Mr. Cox was driving his 1974
(T.36-37)

He testified he

crossed one set of railroad tracks without any difficulty and
then noticed an oncoming set of lights that appeared to be moving
toVlard him in the

eastbound lane.

(T.39)

Cox testified that

the headlights seemed on the north shoulder of the road, with
the oncoming vehicle kicking up dust.

(T.39)

Cox looked
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toward his wife, exclaimed, "Now what do I do"? and swerved!:
car to the left.

(T. 4 o- 41)

Mr. Cox cone 1 uded his testimony

by stating he swerved to the left, into the westbound lane,
because he believed staying where he was or mov ing
·
t o t he ri~'·
would have surely resulted in a head-on crash, whereas if the
driver of the oncoming car maintained his position in the
eastbound lane, a collision would be avoided.

(T.41)

(Steve~.

Hancock, Director of the Payson Hospital Blood Bank, testifiea
that after Thomas Cox signed the consent form (at 12:06 a.m.)

1

he withdrew blood from Mr. Cox for a blood alcohol analysis
(T. 68), the results of which were entered into evidence as
State's Exhibit # 7 and which state that Cox's blood contained
0.00% alcohol.)

The state then cal led Dr. J. Robert Hogan, a physi·
cian who testified that Debra, Melinda and Jeremy Cox all
received fatal facial and head injuries in the accident, and

1

that all were dead on arrival at Payson Hospital.
· k testified
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper David Nusin
that at approximately 1: 15 a.m., May 11, 1976, he arrested
appellant at Payson Hospi· t a 1 f or automobi' le homicide.
He read appellant his rights, and appellant

(T. 57)

said he wanted to '

make one statement, whereupon he asked if anyone was

killed.

. d in the

Officer Nusink responded that three persons had die
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accident.

(T.58)

He testified that appellant then stated

that he had not been driving the vehicle.

(T. 58)

The

officer then reported tr.at he asked appellant if he would
submit to a blood alcohol test; he testified that appellant
said he would allow the test.

{T.59)

A registered nurse at

Roberts, testified that at

Payson General Hospital, Jewel

1:20 a.m., May 11, she withdrew the blood for that test:

entered into evidence as State's Exhibit #5 were the test results,
which state that appellant's alcohol level in his blood was
0.12%.

(T. 64)

Dr. Albert

Swenson, a biochemist, verified the

hlood alcohol results of the three men tested

{T. 72) and

further testified that in his opinion, the level of alcohol in
appellant's blood at the time of the accident would· have been
0.15 - 0.16%.

(T. 76)

On direct examination, Michael Okelberry testified
that he was travelling behind the Cox car on Route 91 when he
saw headlights corning from the east.

From a distance of

approximately a half mile, he saw the headlights of the
oncoming car and the taillights of the Cox car both go out near
the railroad tracks.

(T.85)

He realized something was wrong,

stopped at the scene, and rendered assistance.

(T.85-90)

Finally, he stated that Leo Finster told him that he was not
driving the truck.

(T. 91)
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Officer Gary Johnson of the Utah flighway Patrol \:as
called to testify as an accident investigator.

(T.96)

He

testified that the point of impact was 5' 5" north of the center
line in the westbound lane.

(T. 99)

Officer Nusink was recalled.

He testified that he

and Lt. Newell Knight of the Utah Highway Patrol went to the
accident scene on May 13 and made numerous measurements of
(T.124)

skid marks.
the point

~f

impact, the westbound truck was

eastbound lane.
ing

His findings were that 37 feet back fron

~;pletely

in the I

I

(T .124-125)

The officer also testified concerr,-\

the written statement (State's Exhibit #22) that appellant

had made in :;us ink's presence.

(T .110-111)

Officer Nusink reported that in response to his
question, appellant stated that he had turned his steering
wheel to the right in an attempt to avoid the collision; appellant then made this directional notation in his written statement.

(T .111)

The defense offered the testimony of David H. Lord,
an accident

reconstructionist, who stated his opinion that the

two vehicles might not have been in the attitudes prior to
impact as described by Officer Johnson, offering instead P
alternate theory.

(T.142-153)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE APPELLANT GUILTY OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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J

The fundamental rule governing an appeal on a claim
of insufficient evidence was restated recently by this court in

state v. Hilson, 565 P. 2d 66,68

(Utah 1977):

"The judging of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence is exclusively the prerogative of
the jury. Consequently, we are obliged
to assume that the jury believed those
aspects of the evidence, and drew those
inferences that reasonably could be
drawn therefrom, in the light favorable
to the verdict.
In order for the defendant to successfully challenge and
overturn a verdict on the ground of
insufficiency of the evidence, it must
appear that upon so viewing the evidence,
reasonable minds must necessarily
entertain a reasonable doubt that the
defendant corunitted the crime."
In the instant case the judge was sitting as the
trier of fact, appellant having waived a jury trial.

(T. 3)

Under the Wilson rule, the evidence is sufficient to uphold the
judgement of the court below.
Judge Sorensen made these findings at the close of
trial:
1.

That appellant was driving a public vehicle on

a public highway under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
2.

That appellant was negligent in that he was on

the wrong side of the road;
3.

That appellant's negligence was a cause of the

death of each o f th e persons containe
·
d in
·
eac h o f th e coun t

anc:
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SJ

4.

That although appellant was not criminally

negligent under the statute, he was guilty of the crime
charged.

(T.172)

Utah Code Annotated §76-5-207 (Supp. 1977) :

I

I

provides that an actor who is under the influence of an intoxi-1
eating liquor, to a degree which renders him incapable of safe:. I

.,

driving a vehicle, causes the death of another by operating a
motor vehicle in a negligent manner is guilty of

automobi~

homicide.
Evidence in the record supports the trial court's
findings that each element of the crime was present.
undisputed that at the time of the blood alcohol

It

is

test~dehnH

witness Finster had 0. 08% alcohol in his blood, which under
Utah Code Annotated §41-6-44(3)

(Supp. 1977),gives rise to the

presumption that Finster was under the influence of alcohol.
It is further undisputed that appellant's alcohol level at the
time of his test was 0 .12%, which under Utah Code Annotated
§41-6-44.2 (Supp. 1977),made it unlawful for him to have been
driving.

It is also undisputed that the driver of the second

car, Thomas Cox, had 0.00% alcohol in his blood.

Therefore,

in light of the two versions of events precipitating the
accident, it was within the discretion of the trier of £act to
believe the Cox version, the testimony of a man who was completely sober as he drove along a straight stretch of road, as
opposed to a passenger in another vehicle, under the influence
of alcohol, riding in the truck of appellant, who himself was
so intoxicated as he came around a turn in the road
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that he was

_J

unlawfully behind the steering wheel.
Cox

i

.I

version is supported by physical evidence in the finding of

Gfficer Johnson that 37 feet back frorr. the point of impact the
pickup tr uck was entirely in the wrong lane.

(T. 99)

consequently, the findings of the trial court, being

I

!/

The credibility of the

bot!: reasonable and in accord with sufficient, competent eviaence, should be undisturbed by this court.

POINT II
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF
THE CRIME OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE.
Appellant urges that this Court reconsider and overrule its position in State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1977)
and State v. Anderson, 561P.2d1056 (Utah 1977), wherein this
Court specifically held that:
"Simple negligence in the driving of a motor
vehicle which causes the death of another
person is all that is required when the driver
is so under the influence of liquor as to be
unable to drive his car in a reasonably safe
and prudent manner."
(Anderson at p. 1063).

To the contrary, respondent maintains

that in those cases this court properly and reasonably concluded
that automobile homicide is unique among the various kinds of
criminal homicide as simple negligence is the standard against
which the behavi· or

i· s

to be gauged.

Consequent 1 y, respon d ent

asks that this Court affirm the judgment of the court below.
The Utah rule has always been that automobile
homicide is an

driv

er

·
15

offense requiring simple negligence when the

under the influence of alcohol and causes the death
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2::
Eis!:,

( 13 5~) ,

statt:e, Uta:: :o:ie ..~.r:...""lota.teC.

the

legisla~:.-.·e

··=~

::2s P.2.:. 2:._:;

§76-31:.:-7.~

(1933), a5 3....-:-.e::CeC:,

--- __ _- ,
~

..., ....

.=,~~

....

see.=s e':',.-iG.e::-=

co:-_=: ·.;ded t.=:a--:.

t.:_e

t..11.a~

::·..:=

Le~is:..at:.:re

'"::i=.e ::-_as :r-.::-""-

C:lLe

!las

wher.

:::r..:s~ reca·~::ize that a::y f:i::=. of vehic~:a= ne~lige~ce, raing~e~ ~i~~ g~s ar~
Cccze, p~oC.l..:ces a le~::.al =.ix~:.:.re th3.t,
it ca:.:.se deat~, should pe::a:ize to a greater
Cegree tha~ ~e=~=e, t~e =o~ile, tipsy

we

i:

ve.."licle-operati:i.g bre·,.·-:::aster, in order to
bring to a screeching ha:t the :::ow:ting
holocaust daily dedicated t:o traffic
fatali~ies."

(IC.. at 102C).

7he ne·..r stat'~te, Gtah cc.:.e .:\nr..otc.tee'. )76-s-2:·
(Supp. 1977), provides:
"Cr L-ninal ho:::-.icide co::st:i t:.:.tes a·.: tc:::icl::: ile
homicide if the actor, w:.ile ur.der t:l""e
influence of int8xi=2'"::i::q li~~c= . .. ~2 ~
degree which renders tr.e actor i::-~ca;:ia;ile
of safely drivi:i.g a vehic:e, ca~ses the
death of anotl:er by opera~ing a :::ctcr
vehic:e in a neglige::~ :::2::::er."
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j

f
:..s to
---

-·

::J.ri·.-ers of autor:tobile ho::licide

.:::

C-lr. Justice Eer:riod' s
in 1973 with the
=::::;:::::::: :: :

t:::e ne·,.; s'::a:::.:. ::e, as alcohol related highway fat.a-

?.es:;;onder:':: s·..:::;::-.i':;s that if crir:cinal negligence were
s::e.:::::.ar::: ':;!".at §75-5-207 would, in fact, be surplusage as

-·o

5·~-;-2::

.-

:::-::·.·i::J.es t:-,a'= "cri.":lir.al homicide constitutes

.:e;:.:.;e.::t :.c:::icide if t::e actor, acting with criminal negligence,
If indeed the Legislature
::::"-:::ec :::::li- ::o :::a?:e the alcohol related vehicular homicide a
:::e se-,-ere :::::er:se, it could have acded to §76-5-206 (2) that
:e;:1;er:t :-.a:::.iciC.e is a felor:y of the third degree if the actor
:.o

~

·:e2i:::le driver uncer -the influence of alcohol.
Furthen::.ore,

===

~henever

possible or reasonable, statutes

:::::-.s::r:.:.eC. to be r..eanin:;ful in ther:iselves, neither repetitious
::c= :i.:.s:.a=.onious with other statutes.

.::=..::Code Anr:otated §76-5-201(1)

Given the liI!litations

(Supp. 1977), i t is certainly

= 0 0.sc::~.:.e to view the auto!:'.obile homicide statute as an out-

:::·,:::-_ ::-: tr_e reci<:.less::ess provision, rather than the criminal
.:E:s::;=~::e ele.i.-::ent; for reckless driving is a lesser included

:::e:.se c: driving under the influence.
5

l

~>6-4-L2 is per se a reckless driver.

A drunk driver under
Consequently, if
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_J

convicted under §76-5-207, a driver has acted recklessly in
that he drove while intoxicated and he has acted negligently by
performing the behavior which caused the fatality, i.e., veering
across the center line.

Given these considerations, it was

reasonable and proper that the court in Durrant (supra) and
Anderson (supra) determined that simple negligence was the
appropriate, legislatively-intended standard.
CONCLUSION

Because the evidence was sufficient to
judgment

susta~the

and simple negligence is the appropriate standard of

culpability in automobile homicide cases, respondent urges this
court to affirn the judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN

Attorney General
EARL F • DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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